The present research examines how a single behaviour that is informative of both the morality and intelligence of a person in¯uences impressions, degree of cooperative behaviour expected from that person, and degree of cooperative behaviour displayed toward that person in a mixed-motive interdependence situation (i.e., a social dilemma). Furthermore, it is investigated how individual dierences in social value orientation in¯uence these processes. Participants were provided with behavioural information that could be construed in terms of both morality (high/low) and intelligence (high/low). Consistent with the morality-importance hypothesis, participants assigned greater weight to morality than to intelligence aspects of the information. Congruent with the social value orientation hypothesis (i) only proselfs and not prosocials expected more cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent others, and (ii) prosocials attended more strongly to morality aspects than proselfs in deciding on own cooperation. Finally, consistent with the relative bene®t hypothesis, people overall expected more cooperation than they were willing to display, and this tendency was especially pronounced with others described by moral/unintelligent behaviour, and for people with a proself value orientation. The authors discuss a model describing in¯uences of the perceiver and the perceived on cooperative behaviour.
INTRODUCTION
A person's behaviour is often informative of more than one aspect of his or her personality. Therefore, dierent perceivers may construe the same behaviour of a person in very dierent ways. Consider, for instance, somebody who is willing to do tedious overtime work again and again for a boss who does not reward this behaviour in terms of additional payments or enhanced career prospects. Some people may regard this person as very noble, being intrinsically concerned with the well-being of her co-workers or the organization as a whole. Others, however, may consider her quite stupid for investing in a situation without perspectives. In everyday life, we typically encounter situations in which the information we receive about other people is multi-interpretable. The way in which behavioural information is interpreted will then depend on both the behaviour of the perceived and the personality of the perceiver. The present research focuses on the way in which these two factors in¯u-ence the interpretation of behavioural information, as well as the way in which the resulting impression guides the perceiver's expectations regarding future behaviour of the perceived, and the perceiver's behaviour toward the perceived.
Three assumptions underlie this research. The ®rst is that, in everyday life, people generally form impressions of each other based on observed behaviour, and that this type of information about a person is often multi-interpretable. Our current focus in this respect is on the well-known dimensions of social and intellectual desirability (see e.g. Rosenberg, Nelson and Vivekananthan, 1968; Rosenberg and Sedlak, 1972) , or morality and intelligence 1 . So, when observing behaviour that is indicative of both the actor's morality and intelligence, people will have to make an implicit judgment of the relative importance of these aspects. Generally, this multi-interpretability has not received much attention in research on the way people form impressions from behaviour. The vast majority of prior impression formation studies has used undimensional behavioural descriptions, indicative of either another person's morality (e.g.`gave back extra change at the supermarket') or another person's intelligence (e.g.`spoke four dierent languages¯uently'; Skowronski and Carlston, 1987 ; see also e.g. Coovert and Reeder, 1990; Reeder and Coovert, 1986; Wojciszke, Brycz and Borkenau, 1993 ; an exception, however, is Wojciszke, 1994) . The present research complements this literature by describing target persons in terms of behaviour that can be interpreted simultaneously in terms of both morality and intelligence.
Our second assumption is that perceivers are more likely to dier in their interpretation and use of behavioural information to the extent that such information is interpretable in dierent ways, as the possibility for dierent interpretations leaves room for individual dierences to in¯uence these processes. The assumption that our impression of others might be as informative about ourselves as it is about the other person (cf. Bruner, 1957 ) is widely shared among personality and social psychologists. To our knowledge, however, it has received little empirical attention. We explicitly investigate the in¯uence of individual dierences.
Finally, our third assumption is that people do not form impressions in a vacuumÐthey do so for a reason. In most interpersonal situations, people are dependent on others for some goal they seek to attain, and they have to interact with these others to try to do so. Impressions of others can be helpful in deciding what behaviour to expect from others, and how to behave oneself (cf. Fiske, 1992) . Speci®cally, we investigated inferences people draw from behavioural information in an interactive situation in which people are dependent on one another, and in which they have the option to choose between pursuing self-interest or collective interestÐa mixed-motive interdependence situation. Many interpersonal situations share features of mixed-motive interdependence. For example, when working on a project 1 We are of the opinion that the dimensions of social and intellectual desirability represent more than just morality and intelligence. Our notion is that the ®rst dimension represents traits and behaviours that are socially good or bad (or other-pro®table, see Peeters and Czapinski, 1990) , whereas the second dimension represents competence-related (or self-pro®table) traits and behaviours. However, in the present research we operationalized these dimensions as morality and intelligence, respectively. with a colleague, it is often tempting to leave the most tedious parts of the job for the other person to do. However, if you both act this way, the project is unlikely to make much progress. A feature of this type of situation is that it provides no clues on whether to view the other as a`partner' or as an`opponent'. Therefore, it is useful to form an impression of the other person and of the behaviour one may expect from him or her, in order to decide how to behave toward this person.
The aim of our current study was threefold. First, we intended to demonstrate that, apart from perceiver in¯uences, morality aspects of behavioural information are generally more important than intelligence aspects in terms of predictive utility (Sherman, Judd and Park, 1989) ; that is, attending to morality aspects of information about another person is more useful than attending to intelligence aspects (cf. Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, Bazinska and Joworski, 1998) . Second, we examined how individual dierences in social value orientation (i.e. prosocial versus individualistic and competitive orientation, McClintock, 1972) would in¯uence inferences drawn from morality and intelligence information. Third, we investigated how the dierences between levels of expected and own cooperation varied with characteristics of the perceiver and the perceived.
The importance of morality
Previous research has demonstrated that when people think about others, they give more attention and weight to these others' morality rather than intelligence characteristics (Wojciszke, 1994; 1997; Wojciszke et al., 1998) . We complement this research by investigating the importance of morality in an interaction context. This is all the more important, because explanations for the relative importance of morality unambiguously rely on interaction (and interdependence) between people. First, morality can be de®ned as a sense of obligation toward others and the absence of anpintention to harm others (cf. Deutsch, 1982; Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994) . Therefore, expectations of cooperativeness can be drawn more easily from morality than from intelligence information, as morality aspects are indicative of a person's trustworthiness. Second, morality information is explicitly interpersonal in nature. The positive or negative consequences for others of a person's dispositional (im)morality are very clear (Wojciszke et al., 1993 ; see also the concept of otherpro®tability of Peeters and Czapinski, 1990) . So, another person's morality tells you more about probable behaviour toward you than his or her intelligence. In sum, the morality of the perceived is both salient and relevant for the perceiver (cf. Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke et al., 1998) . Accordingly, we predicted that in a mixed-motive interdependence situation people will attend more strongly to the other person's morality than to his or her intelligence, resulting in stronger eects for morality than for intelligence on global impressions, and on levels of expected cooperation and cooperation displayed (morality-importance hypothesis).
Individual dierences in social value orientation
A second purpose of the current research is to investigate the way in which predictive utility assigned to morality versus intelligence aspects diers with the perceiver's personalityÐmore speci®cally, with his or her social value orientation (McClintock, 1972) . People have been found to dier systematically in the weight they assign to outcomes for themselves and others. Generally, three types of social value orientation are distinguished (cf. Deutsch, 1960) . First, prosocials value outcomes for both self and others positively. They will be motivated to strive for the best outcomes for all persons involved, and to minimize the dierences between outcomes for self and others. Second, individualists only assign positive value to their own outcomes, and try to obtain the best outcomes for themselves. Finally, competitors assign positive value to their own outcomes and negative value to others' outcomes, and seek to obtain better outcomes than others. These three orientations have been found to be stable over time (Kuhlman, Camac and Cunha, 1986; McClintock and Allison, 1989) , and predictive of behaviour in a variety of social situations (i.e. in social dilemma experiments, e.g. Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand and McClintock, 1988; Van Lange, 1992 , as well as in everyday life, e.g. helping behaviour, McClintock and Allison, 1989; donation, Van Lange and Schuyt, 1997 ; see also Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin and Joireman, 1997) .
People with dierent social value orientations dier not only in the levels of cooperative behaviour they display (and expect from others), but also in the way in which they interpret mixed-motive interdependence situations, or social dilemmas (see e.g. Kuhlman, Brown and Teta, 1992; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken and Suhre, 1986; Sattler and Kerr, 1991; Van Lange and Liebrand, 1991a) . Prosocials view a mixed-motive situation in terms of collective rationality and morality: they consider it good, and, from a collective viewpoint, rational to cooperate. Individualists and competitors, on the other hand, view a mixed-motive situation in terms of individual rationality and intelligence: they believe that non-cooperation is the intelligent, rational thing to do. Hence, prosocials interpret the (non)cooperative behaviour of an interdependent other in terms of morality, whereas individualists and competitors interpret the same behaviour in terms of intelligence (see e.g. Liebrand et al., 1986; Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994) . Accordingly, prosocials have been found to assign more weight to personality test information about another person's morality rather than intelligenceÐeven to the extent that they do not even use intelligence information when morality information is also present (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994) . Individualists and competitors, on the other hand, have been found to assign more weight to personality test information about another person's intelligence. It has not been investigated, however, whether these dierences would persist were people provided with multi-interpretable behavioural information, instead of clear-cut information about a person's dispositional level of morality or intelligence according to a (bogus) personality test.
Overall, these dierences primarily distinguish prosocials from individualists and competitors. Therefore, in the current study, we combined individualists and competitors into a group labelled proself (for identical procedures, see Van Lange and Liebrand, 1989) . We predicted that, when confronted with behavioural information that is interpretable in terms of both morality and intelligence, prosocials would attend more to the morality dimension, leading to stronger morality eects for prosocials than for proselfs on expected and own cooperation. Also, we predicted that proselfs would attend more to the intelligence dimension, leading to stronger intelligence eects for proselfs than for prosocials on these measures (social value orientation hypothesis). 
Relative bene®t
Our third and ®nal purpose was to explore how dierences between expected and own cooperation would vary with characteristics of the perceiver and the perceived. We expected that people would expect higher levels of cooperation from others than they would be willing to display themselvesÐ`just to be on the safe side'. This deviation from reciprocity has received empirical support in previous research (e.g. Van Lange and Semin-Goossens, 1998). We will refer to this dierence between expected and own cooperation as relative bene®t. Our aim was to investigate whether relative bene®t would be especially large with some targets or with some perceivers. First, regarding in¯uences of the perceived on relative bene®t, we expected that relative bene®t would be largest for moral and unintelligent targets 2 . People would expect high levels of cooperation from these targets because of their morality. At the same time, we anticipated that people would be less inclined to reciprocate these high levels of cooperation with moral/unintelligent than with moral/intelligent others: people would form a more negative global impression of the former, or they would consider them as unable to retaliate 3 . Second, regarding in¯uences of the perceiver on relative bene®t, we expected that relative bene®t would be larger overall for proselfs than for prosocials, because the latter are generally more inclined to reciprocate levels of expected cooperation (see e.g. De Dreu and McCusker, 1997; Van Lange, Agnew, Harinck and Steemers, 1997). Moreover, we expected that in¯uences of the perceiver and the perceived on relative bene®t would interact. As proselfs associate lack of intelligence with cooperative behaviour, they are likely to expect high levels of cooperation from moral/unintelligent targets not only because of their morality, but also because of their lack of intelligence. So, proselfs may expect even higher levels of cooperation from moral/unintelligent others than would prosocials. At the same time, they would be less inclined to reciprocate. Therefore, we expected that the large relative bene®t with moral/unintelligent others would be especially pronounced for proselfs.
Research design and overview of hypotheses
We ®rst assessed participants' social value orientation. Next, participants were successively paired with a number of other persons in a social dilemma task, representing a con¯ict between one's own interest and collective interest. Participants received behavioural information (either moral/intelligent, moral/unintelligent, immoral/intelligent, or immoral/unintelligent) about these persons.
To summarize, we advanced the following hypotheses. First, we expected the morality aspects of behavioural information to have stronger eects on global impressions, and on levels of expected cooperation and cooperation displayed, than the intelligence aspects (morality-importance hypothesis). Second, we expected that dierences in social value orientation would in¯uence the way in which information is used for deriving expectations and deciding on own behaviour. We predicted (i) that prosocials would attend more to the morality dimension, leading to stronger morality eects for prosocials than for proselfs on expected and own cooperation, and (ii) that proselfs would attend more to the intelligence dimension, leading to stronger intelligence eects for proselfs than for prosocials on these measures (social value orientation hypothesis). Finally, we expected that relative bene®t would be largest with moral/unintelligent others, especially for proselfs (relative bene®t hypothesis).
METHOD Participants and design
Participants were 164 students at the Free University of Amsterdam, recruited by means of an advertisement in the university newspaper. The design included social value orientation (prosocial versus proself) as a between-participant factor, and morality of other (moral versus immoral) and intelligence of other (intelligent versus unintelligent) as within-participant factors.
Procedure
The experiment was run self-paced on personal computers in individual cubicles, and was part of larger session that included multiple studies. First, participants' social value orientation was assessed. Next, the social dilemma task was explained. Participants then engaged in this two-person task with a number of (®ctitious) target persons successively, each described either by a moral and intelligent, an immoral and intelligent, a moral and unintelligent, or an immoral and unintelligent behavioural description. Finally, participants were debriefed and paid for participation.
Assessment of social value orientation
Participants' social value orientation was assessed by means of a series of nine socalled decomposed games, each involving a choice between a prosocial, an individualistic, and a competitive option. Consistent with prior research, people were classi®ed as prosocials, individualists, or competitors if they made at least six out of nine choices consistent with one of these orientations (the decomposed games procedure is discussed more extensively by Van Lange et al., 1997b) . We identi®ed 77 prosocials, 42 individualists, and 25 competitors. Twenty participants could not be classi®ed. This distribution resembles the distributions found in previous research using the same or similar measures (e.g. McClintock and Allison, 1989; Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994) . As noted earlier, we collapsed participants across individualists and competitors, resulting in 77 prosocials (37 men, 40 women) and 67 proselfs (23 men, 44 women).
The decision making task
The mixed-motive interdependence situation was presented to participants in the form of a decision making task. Participants were told that the study involved making choices between options that would aect both the number of points they would receive and the number of points that another person would receive. They were told that for every choice they made, they would be paired with another person, about whom they would receive some information before they had to make their choices. They received no information about the number of persons they would be paired with.
The decision making task was adopted from prior research (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994; Van Lange and Liebrand, 1991a; . Participants were told that upon each new pairing with a person, this person would have four yellow points, each of which was worth 50 Dutch cents to him or her, but worth 100 Dutch cents to the participant. They were told further that they themselves would have four blue points upon each new pairing with a new person, each worth 50 Dutch cents to the participant, but worth 100 Dutch cents to the order person. Instructions stated that although the points represented money, the study would not involve additional monetary payos. Participants were told that their task was to decide how many pointsÐnone, one, two, three, or fourÐthey would give to the other person. They were also led to believe that the other person would decide how many points he or she would give to them. It was stressed that every point transferred results in a 50c loss for the giver and a 100c gain for the receiver. After a few calculation examples, participants were provided with a table containing the 5 Â 5 payo matrix for the task, displaying the outcomes for both themselves and the other person for all possible combinations of own and other's choices. Participants could consult this table throughout the experiment. Additionally, a ten-item questionnaire to check participants' comprehension of the task was administered, the results of which showed that all participants comprehended the task structure.
4 Following explanation and comprehension check, it was repeated that upon each pairing with a new person the participant would again have four blue points, and the other person four yellow points.
Half of the participants ®rst engaged in the social dilemma task with all targets successively, and thereafter rated their global impression of all targets successively. The other half rated their global impression of a target, engaged in the social dilemma task with this target, and then went on to the next target. Preliminary analyses showed no consistent pattern of eects for order, so this variable will not be further discussed.
Manipulation of morality and intelligence
Participants were told that they would receive information about recent behaviour of the persons with whom they would be paired, by noting that such information may facilitate decision making. They were also told that the other persons would not receive any information about the participant. The behavioural descriptions were selected from a two-step pretest study. A ®rst group of eight people were asked to generate examples of behaviours that were either (a) moral and intelligent, (b) moral and unintelligent, (c) immoral and intelligent, or (d) immoral and unintelligent. They were asked to generate three behaviours of each category. The behaviours thus generated were reformulated so that they had about equal word lengths. Next, we asked a second group of 36 pretest participants to rate these behaviours. Speci®cally, they rated, ®rst, to what the extent the behaviours were moral or immoral, and intelligent or unintelligent. After this, they rated to what extent the behaviours were informative of the person's morality and intelligence (i.e. the diagnosticity of the behaviours for morality and intelligence). All ratings were made on seven-point scales. Pretest participants of this second group were told that all behaviours had been observed among dierent persons. The order in which the descriptions were presented was randomized for each pretest participant. Also, the behaviours rated by half of these pretest participants were displayed by male actors; the other half rated the same behaviours displayed by female actors. Gender of actor had no eects on the pretest ratings. From this pretest, we selected two behaviours from each category that scored higher than 4 on both seven-point diagnosticity scales, and either higher than 5 or lower than 3 on the scales for morality and intelligence. For instance, the moral/ unintelligent behaviours scored higher than 4 on diagnosticity for morality and diagnosticity for intelligence, higher than 5 on the morality scale, and lower than 3 on the intelligence scale. The behaviours used are listed in the appendix.
In the main study, participants were shown one of these behaviours per target person, and were led to believe that this target had displayed the behaviour last week. Participants were paired with eight targets, two in each category. The order in which the targets were presented was randomized for each participant. We also systematically varied target gender. First, half of the targets were male and the other half were female. Furthermore, counterbalanced with other variations, half of the targets that were male in one version, were female in the other version, and vice versa. Preliminary analyses showed no consistent pattern of eects including target gender version; these variables will not be further discussed.
Dependent measures
Participants were asked how many pointsÐnone, one, two, three, or fourÐthey expected the other person to give to them (expected cooperation), and how many pointsÐnone, one, two, three, or fourÐthey gave to the target (own cooperation). Also, they rated their global impression of the target on a ®ve-point scale (À2, very negative; 2, very positive).
RESULTS
For all dependent measuresÐglobal impressions, expected cooperation, own cooperation, and relative bene®tÐmean scores were computed across the two targets per category. These means are displayed in Table 1 . The data were analysed by means of a series of analyses of variance, with social value orientation (prosocial versus proself) and participant gender (male versus female) as between-participant factors, and morality (moral versus immoral) and intelligence (intelligent versus unintelligent) of the targets as within-participant factors. The results of these analyses will be discussed below. 5 Apart from the eects discussed in the text, we also found eects including participant gender, suggesting that the morality dimension was more important for women than for men, which is consistent with previous research by Wojciszke (1994; Wojciszke et al., 1998) . First, we found an interaction between morality and gender on global impressions, F (1,140) 9.47, p 5 0.005. Whereas both men and women
Morality-importance hypothesis
We expected that the morality aspects of the information would have stronger eects on global impressions, and on levels of expected cooperation and cooperation displayed, than the intelligence aspects. This prediction received strong support in that morality main eects on these variables were stronger than intelligence main eects.
First, for global impressions, we found main eects for morality, F(1, 140) 601.30, p 5 0.001, and intelligence, F(1, 140) 78.40, p 5 0.001, as well as a morality by intelligence interaction, F(1, 140) 4.58, p 5 0.05. Overall, moral targets elicited more favourable impressions than did immoral targets (M 0.78 versus M À0.81, SDs 0.40 and 0.51, respectively), and intelligent targets elicited more favourable impressions than unintelligent targets (M 0.17 versus M À0.20, SDs 0.36 and 0.33, respectively). A direct test of the morality-importance hypothesis showed that the dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 1.56) was more pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean dierence of 0.36), t(143) 15.61, p 5 0.001. Furthermore, looking at the means in Table 1 , we observe that moral/unintelligent targets elicited more favourable impressions than did immoral/intelligent targets. The behaviour of both was positive in one respect and negative in another respect, so this means that greater weight is given to morality than to intelligence. Finally, the pattern of the morality by intelligence interaction shows that morality and intelligence strengthen each other's eects. Note: Global impression ratings were made on ®ve-point scales anchored À2 and 2. Expected and own cooperation and the dierences between them are in points, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 4. Within a row, means with dierent subscripts are dierent at p 5 0.01.
judged moral targets more favourably than immoral targets, this dierence was more pronounced for women (0.82 versus À0.89) than for men (0.69 versus À0.65). So, women judged both moral targets more favourably (0.82 versus 0.69) and immoral targets less favourably (À0.89 versus À0.65) than did men. Second, we found an interaction between morality and gender on cooperative behaviour, F (1,140) 8.65, p 5 0.005. Although both men and women displayed more cooperation toward moral targets than toward immoral targets, this dierence was again more pronounced for women (1.94 versus 0.61) than for men (1.75 versus 0.81). So, women both behaved more cooperatively toward moral targets (1.94 versus 1.75) and less cooperatively toward immoral targets (0.61 versus 0.81) than did men. The only other eect obtained was an unexpected four-way interaction between social value orientation, participant gender, morality, and intelligence on the dierence between expected and own cooperation, F (1, 140) 4.34, p 5 0.05. As this interaction did not show any meaningful pattern, and because of the large number of possible chance eects, this eect will not be further discussed.
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For levels of expected cooperation, we also found main eects for morality, F(1, 140) 341.55, p 5 0.001, and intelligence, F(1, 140) 18.99, p 5 0.001, and a morality by intelligence interaction, F(1, 140) 32.74, p 5 0.001. Overall, higher levels of cooperation were expected from moral than from immoral targets (M 2.34 versus M 0.91, SDs 0.84 and 0.80, respectively), and higher levels of cooperation were expected from unintelligent targets than from intelligent targets (M 1.75 versus M 1.50, SDs 0.71 and 0.83, respectively). Again, we found that the overall eect for morality was more pronounced than the eect for intelligence; that is, the dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 1.42) was more pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean dierence of 0.24), t(143) 13.28, p 5 0.001. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 1 , the pattern of the interaction was such that the intelligence eect was signi®cant only for targets who displayed moral behaviour, and not for targets who displayed immoral behaviour.
For levels of own cooperation, we only found a main eect for morality, F(1, 140) 341.55, p 5 0.001: moral targets elicited more cooperation than did immoral targets (M 1.86 versus M 0.70, SDs 1.06 and 0.87). The main eect for intelligence and the morality by intelligence interaction were not signi®cant. Clearly, then, morality had more impact than intelligenceÐthat is, the dierence between moral and immoral targets (a mean dierence of 1.16) was more pronounced than the dierence between intelligent and unintelligent targets (a mean dierence of 0.02), t(143) 12.28, p 5 0.001. In sum, the morality aspects of the behavioural information had stronger eects on global impressions, levels of expected cooperation, and own cooperation than the intelligence aspects.
Individual dierences in social value orientation
We found a main eect for social value orientation on expected cooperation, F(1, 140) 6.87, p 5 0.02): prosocials expected greater levels of cooperation than did proselfs (M 1.76 versus M 1.47, SDs 0.69 and 0.66). Furthermore, a main eect for social value orientation on own cooperation, F(1, 140) 17.70, p 5 0.001, showed that prosocials also displayed higher levels of cooperation than did proselfs (M 1.54 versus M 0.98, SDs 0.87 and 0.75). These eects are consistent with previous research. More interesting, however, are the interactions between social value orientation and morality, and between social value orientation and intelligence.
We expected, ®rst, that prosocials would attend more to the morality aspects of the information, leading to stronger morality eects for prosocials than for proselfs on expected and own cooperation. The analyses revealed an interaction between social value orientation and morality on levels of cooperation displayed toward the targets, F(1,140) 6.85, p 5 0.02. Both prosocials and proselfs displayed more cooperation toward moral versus immoral targets; this dierence was much more pronounced for prosocials (M 2.21 versus M 0.88, SDs 1.05 and 0.96, respectively) than for proselfs (M 1.46 versus M 0.49, SDs 0.94 and 0.71, respectively; see Figure 1 , right panel). This is consistent with our hypothesis. The interaction between social value orientation and morality on expected cooperation was not signi®cant, F(1, 140) 1.80, n.s.: prosocials and proselfs did not dier systematically in the way they derived expectations from information regarding morality versus immorality. No interaction was obtained between social value orientation and morality on global impressions; that is, individual dierences in social value orientation did not in¯uence the way in which participants formed global impressions of targets diering in morality.
Second, we expected that proselfs would attend more strongly to intelligence aspects, leading to stronger intelligence eects for proselfs than for prosocials on expected and own cooperation. We found a signi®cant interaction between social value orientation and intelligence on levels of expected cooperation, F(1, 140) 12.76, p 5 0.001. Consistent with our hypothesis, proselfs expected more cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent targets (M 1.71 versus M 1.24, SDs 0.75 and 0.75), while prosocials did not make this dierence (M 1.78 versus M 1.74, SDs 0.67 and 0.83, respectively; see Figure 2 , left panel). This means that the overall main eect for intelligence on expected cooperation is due to the expectations of proselfs, and not those of prosocials. The interaction between social value orientation and intelligence on own cooperative behaviour was not signi®cant, F(1, 140) 5 1: prosocials and proselfs did not dier in the levels of cooperation they displayed toward intelligent versus unintelligent others. The interaction between social value orientation and intelligence on global impressions was also not signi®cant; that is, individual dierences in social value orientation did not in¯uence the way in which participants formed global impressions of targets diering in intelligence.
Relative bene®t
We expected that participants would, overall, expect more cooperation from others than they would be willing to display themselves, and that this relative bene®t would be largest with moral/unintelligent others. In order to investigate this, we computed the dierence between levels of cooperation expected and displayed as a measure of relative bene®t. As can be seen in Table 1 , we found strong support for our hypothesis. Overall, participants expected more cooperation from the target than they . These main eects, however, were quali®ed by a signi®cant morality and intelligence interaction, F(1, 140) 29.54, p 5 0.001. Consistent with expectations, relative bene®t was greater with moral/unintelligent targets than with any other target type (see Table 1 for means) 6 . Furthermore, not only characteristics of the perceived, but also those of the perceiver, in¯uenced relative bene®t. The expected main eect of social value orientation on relative bene®t was obtained, F(1, 140) 10.69, p 5 0.002: overall, relative bene®t was larger for proselfs than for prosocials (M 0.49 versus M 0.22, SDs 0.55 and 0.47, respectively). Finally, we found an interaction between social value orientation and intelligence on relative bene®t, F(1, 140) 9.83, p 5 0.005). Although both prosocials and proselfs overall exhibited greater relative bene®t with Figure 2 . Levels of expected and own cooperation for proselfs and prosocials depending on targets' intelligence 6 The pattern of the correlations between the dependent variables is congruent with the greater relative bene®t for (especially moral) unintelligent targets, in that cooperative behaviour toward these targets is related less strongly to expectations and more strongly to global impressions. More speci®cally, correlations between expectations and own cooperative behaviour were generally high (and all signi®cant at p 5 0.001), but they were higher for intelligent than for unintelligent targetsÐ0.81 for moral/intelligent targets, 0.83 for immoral/intelligent targets, 0.56 for moral/unintelligent targets, and 0.63 for immoral/ unintelligent targets. Correlations between global impressions and cooperative behaviour were much lower overall, but these were lowest for intelligent targetsÐnamely 0.17 for moral/intelligent and immoral/ intelligent targets (both p 5 0.05), 0.30 for moral/unintelligent targets ( p 5 0.001), and 0.22 for immoral/ unintelligent targets ( p 5 0.01).
Correlations between global impressions and expected cooperation varied from 0.14 to 0.19 (0.18 for moral/intelligent, 0.14 for immoral/intelligent, 0.19 for immoral/unintelligent, and 0.16 for moral/ unintelligent targets; p 5 0.05 for only two of these r values). unintelligent than with intelligent targets, this tendency was more pronounced for proselfs (M 0.72 versus M 0.27, SDs 0.74 and 0.52, respectively) than for prosocials (M 0.27 versus M 0.16, SDs 0.66 and 0.41, respectively) .
DISCUSSION
The present research investigated in¯uences of the perceiver and the perceived on the way in which perceivers use behaviourial information in forming global evaluative impressions of the perceived, in deriving expectations regarding levels of cooperation expected from the perceived, and in deciding on own cooperative or noncooperative behaviour toward the perceived. We found support for three hypotheses, regarding (i) the overall importance of morality, (ii) the in¯uence of individual dierences in social value orientation on the use of behavioural information, and (iii) the increased relative bene®t with interdependent others who are both moral and unintelligent, especially by people with a proself orientation.
First, consistent with the morality-importance hypothesis, people assign more weight to the morality aspects of behavioural information than to the intelligence aspects. Perceivers consider morality to be of greater predictive utility than intelligence: expectations regarding the other's cooperative or noncooperative behaviour are based more strongly on a person's morality than on his or her intelligence. Also, people base their own cooperative or noncooperative behaviour more strongly on the other person's morality than on intelligence. Finally, people's global evaluative impressions of the other person are determined more strongly by morality than by intelligence aspects of the information. As noted before, this overall importance of morality is most probably due to its clear interpersonal nature. Unlike intelligence, morality information is, in a relatively straightforward manner, indicative of a person's good or bad intentions regarding behaviour toward other people. Therefore, attending to another person's morality helps you predict his or her likely behaviour toward yourself. Another reason for the importance of morality may be that the meaning of morality information is less ambiguous than the meaning of intelligence. Whereas a person's (im)morality directly leads to the conclusion that the person will act (non)cooperatively, a person's intelligence can be interpreted as indicative of either cooperative or noncooperative future behaviour.
Second, as we have seen, this dierential interpretation varies with the perceiver's social value orientation. Consistent with the social value orientation hypothesis, proselfs expect higher levels of cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent others, whereas prosocials do not make this dierence. Thus, a person's own interpersonal goal determines what kind of behaviour will be considered intelligent, or rational (i.e. the goal prescribes rationality principle; cf. Van Lange and Liebrand, 1991a) . There is no direct relationship between perceived intelligence and self-interest; that is, such a relationship only exists for proselfs, but not for prosocials. This is clearly at variance with traditional theorizing in game theory and economic theory (cf. Luce and Raia, 1957; Roth, 1988) , in which the pursuit of immediate self-interest was viewed as the rational optionÐfor everybody.
Although proselfs expect higher levels of cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent people, they do not dier in the levels of cooperation they display toward intelligent versus unintelligent people. The ®nding that proselfs are not likely to
The double meaning of a single act 177 reciprocate high levels of expected cooperation is also consistent with prior research. Indeed, proselfs are generally less likely than prosocials to base their own behaviour on the levels of cooperation they expect from others (see e.g. De Dreu and McCusker, 1997; Van Lange et al., 1997a) . Also consistent with the social value orientation hypothesis is the ®nding that prosocials assign more weight to morality aspects of the information. Whereas both prosocials and proselfs display more cooperation toward moral than toward immoral targets, this dierence is much more pronounced for prosocials. Interestingly, prosocials and proselfs did not dier in levels of cooperation expected from moral versus immoral others. So, even though people with prosocial and proself value orientations expect similar levels of cooperation from others based on morality information, they still dier in the extent to which they are willing to reciprocate this expected cooperation. Prosocials base their own level of cooperative behaviour more on the other's morality than proselfs. In sum, these results provide evidence in favour of our assumption that multi-interpretable information leaves room for perceivers to (implicitly) decide what aspects of the information they will give most weight (cf. Bruner, 1957) .
Our third, and more exploratory relative bene®t hypothesis pertained to the dierence between levels of cooperation expected from and displayed toward the other person. As predicted, people overall expect higher levels of cooperation than they are willing to display themselves, and this dierence is especially pronounced with moral/unintelligent others. Furthermore, we found the perceiver's social value orientation to in¯uence relative bene®t in two respects. First, the dierence between expected and own cooperation appeared to be much more pronounced overall for proselfs than for prosocials. This is congruent with the notion described earlier, that prosocials are more likely than proselfs to base their own behaviour on the expected behaviour from others, and to reciprocate these levels of expected cooperation. Second, the ®nding that relative bene®t is largest for moral/unintelligent others was due to the high level of cooperation expected from these persons, and not to low levels of cooperation displayed toward them. As we saw earlier, only proselfs, and not prosocials, expect more cooperation from unintelligent than from intelligent others. So, proselfs are primarily responsible for the large relative bene®t with moral/ unintelligent others.
A MODEL DESCRIBING INFLUENCES OF PERCEIVER AND PERCEIVED IN COOPERATIVE INTERACTIONS
In determining to what extent a perceiver will display cooperative or noncooperative behaviour toward a person perceived, attributes of both the perceived and the perceiver play a role. Based on the above results, we propose the following model describing how the perceiver, when confronted with behavioural information indicative of another person's morality and intelligence, decides on own cooperative behaviour. This model is congruent with other studies describing how morality and intelligence of the perceived and the social value orientation of the perceiver lead to cooperative or noncooperative behaviour (e.g. Van Lange and Liebrand, 1989; 1991a; . Of course, this model is preliminary in several respects, and needs further research to validate or invalidate its claims.
A perceiver probably ®rst attends to informational aspects regarding the morality of the perceived, and uses these in deriving expectations about this person's likely behaviour. If the other person is perceived as rather moral, high levels of cooperation are expected, and the situation becomes one in which the perceiver can look for ways to maximize his or her gains. On the other hand, if the person is perceived as rather immoral, low levels of cooperation are expected, and the situation becomes one in which the perceiver has to look for ways to minimize his or her losses.
In this latter case, the impact of information that the other is immoral will be so strong that neither the intelligence of the perceived, nor the social value orientation of the perceiver will play a role any further (for evidence concerning the large impact of negative morality information, see e.g. Reeder and Coovert, 1986) . The perceiver expects and displays low levels of cooperation. Exactly how low these levels are will depend on the perceiver's social value orientation. If, on the other hand, the other person is perceived as moral, other attributes of the perceiver and the perceived can play a roleÐpartly, maybe, because positive morality information is consistent with social norms, and therefore not very informative (Jones and Davis, 1965) . However, this will only be the case for perceivers with a proself value orientation. Prosocials will not attend to intelligence aspects when morality aspects are also present (Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994) ; and when this morality information is positive, they will expect and display high levels of cooperation. Proselfs, on the other hand, do use intelligence information in deriving expectations. If the other is perceived as unintelligent, proselfs will expect higher levels of cooperation than when the other person is intelligent. In both cases, however, the proself perceiver will display similar levels of cooperation toward the perceived, so that the result is larger relative bene®t with moral/ unintelligent than moral/intelligent others.
In sum, if the person described in the introduction were hired in our department, we would all ®rst attend to her moral nature, which would determine our impressions of her. Prosocials among us would attend to her morality only. They would expect relatively high levels of cooperation from her, and be willing to reciprocate these to some extent (but not completely). Proselfs among us would also attend strongly to her being incompetent. Hence, they would expect her to be extremely cooperative, but they would not be inclined to reciprocate.
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
We would like to close by pointing out some of the strengths and limitations of this research. First, one of the strengths of this research is that we used behavioural descriptions that were not designed to be informative of only one dimension, but captured aspects of the two most important dimensions in impression formationÐ social and intellectual desirability. This multi-faceted nature of behavioural information has largely been neglected in impression formation research. We contend that its openness to interpretation is one of the most important aspects of behavioural information, in that it allows for dierent interpretations by dierent people. This phenomenon will at least in part be responsible for the diversity and complexity of impressions made in everyday life situations.
Another strength of this study is that it investigates impression formation in an interaction context, in which perceivers and targets are mutually dependent and able to
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We are aware of the fact that we must regard the above results as somewhat preliminary, as they are based on only two behavioural descriptions per target category. That is, the descriptions may have contained idiosyncratic characteristics that have in¯uenced the results in unforeseen ways. Even then, however, it is important to note that most of our results are consistent with hypotheses. The readiness with which people derive such diverse global evaluative impressions, and such diverse conclusions about other's and own behaviour, from mere behavioural descriptions provides strong evidence for the powerful informational value of human behaviour in guiding impression formation and social interaction.
